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This is an important and ambitious book but its timing could not be more unfortunate. It is the 
result of a two year research project co-sponsored by the Economic Development Institute 
(EDI) at the World Bank and by the Center for Economic Policy Research at Stanford 
University. The contributors who are based in the US, Japan, Korea and Malaysia are all 
leading experts in the subject. The book was apparently completed in October 1995; it 
therefore predates the current acute economic and financial crisis in the East Asian countries. 
 
The authors’ main objective is to explain why government interventions apparently succeeded 
in East Asia whilst they have failed elsewhere. What lessons concerning the role of 
government should developing and developed countries draw from the East Asian 
experience?  Using theoretical and comparative institutional analysis, the authors attempt to 
identify the nature of government interventions, the conditions under which they are likely to 
aid economic development and the circumstances in which they would hinder it. 
 
The present economic meltdown in East Asia, however, raises an opposite set of questions. 
These are being asked, not without a degree of triumphalism, by financial journalists and 
popular commentators in the West. Significantly, serious analysts and policy makers at the 
highest levels also suggest that the present Asian crisis was a disaster waiting to happen in 
view of the dirigiste model of capitalism which East Asian countries had been following. 
Thus Alan Greenspan, the cautious and highly respected Chairman of the US Federal 
Reserve, told the Senate Relations Committee last spring that the dismantling of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 symbolised the end of Socialism as a way of organising economic activity. This, 
however, left the world with two kinds of capitalism - the Asian kind and the free-market 
Western kind. Greenspan goes on to say that as long as this Asian capitalism generated 
growth rates of 10% p.a. it was difficult to fault it; nevertheless, it was clear all along that the 
underlying structures of this alternative capitalism were faulty. [Quoted in Singh (1998)] 
 
The IMF has adopted a similar view of the Asian crisis. It has suggested that whatever the 
immediate triggers for the crisis (for example, the short term macroeconomic imbalances or 
property market bubbles) its ‘deeper’ causes  were ‘structural’. These derived effectively from 
the Asian model of capitalism which led to cronyism, over-investment, lack of competition 
and disregard for profits. Therefore, in its adjustment programmes for the crisis affected 
Asian countries the IMF’s  conditionality requires fundamental structural changes in the 
existing systems of  corporate governance, labour laws, the relationship between banks and 
business, and capital market regulation both internal and external. In short, the Fund would 
like Asian countries not only to radically alter their traditionally close government/business 
relationships, but to have a much diminished role for the government in economic activity 
altogether. 
 
Be that as it may, it is still important for economists to ask why the Asian countries grew so 
fast for such a long and sustained period. It is no exaggeration to say that the industrialisation 
of Japan and East Asian NICs in the post-World War II period has been the most successful 
example of fast economic growth in the history of mankind. Why and how did this happen 
and what role did the government play in the process?  Notwithstanding  the current crisis, 
these questions will remain extremely important both for economic theory and economic 
policy. The crisis, of course, raises equally legitimate questions concerning the causal 
connection between government economic interventions and the kind of serious difficulties 
these countries presently find themselves in.  
 
The papers in this book provide answers only to the first set of questions. Nevertheless, 
towards the end, the review will also comment on the second set of questions in relation to 
the authors’ analyses. 
 
II 
The role of the government in the East Asian economic miracle has long divided economists 
and there is still no consensus - except now at long last on the fact that the government 
intervened heavily in these economies. [For citations to the large literature on the subject, see 
Singh (1994, 1997)]. The Bretton-Woods Institutions (BWIs) have been leading participants 
in this debate; their contributions are the starting point of this book. To put the analyses of the 
book into perspective, it is important to note that the BWIs theses on East Asian development 
have undergone three major transformations in the last seven years.  The World Bank’s 1991 
seminal publication, which was supposed to represent  what the Bank economists had learnt 
from forty years of development experience, investigated the following question: why did a 
country like Japan which at the end of the war was under-developed and in serious economic 
difficulties succeed so spectacularly whilst many others failed. The Bank economists 
concluded that Japan and other East Asian countries had followed a  ‘market friendly’ 
strategy of  development. ‘Market friendly’ was defined as meaning that the state did not 
intervene actively in the economy but rather had a night watchman role of providing the 
infrastructure, the legal framework etc. for the private sector to flourish. In response to the 
criticisms from the academic community that this was not an accurate reading of the 
historical record, the Bank in another major contribution (World Bank 1993, hereafter called 
the EAM -the East Asia Miracle) conceded to its critics and acknowledged that government 
interventions in East Asia were extensive and far-reaching  and went far beyond the ‘market 
friendly’ definition. However, at the policy level the EAM did not budge very much from its 
previous stance - insisting that the most useful policy for developing  countries was still to get 
the ‘prices right’, to follow their comparative advantage and basically to implement the 
‘market-friendly’ strategy of development.  
 
Nevertheless, as the contributors to the volume under review note, the EAM represented, at a 
theoretical level, a path-breaking advance for Bank economists in their analysis of economic 
development.  Among other things, the EAM provided a sophisticated discussion of co-
ordination failures in market economies and introduced several new concepts to reconcile the 
East Asian experience with economic theory, e.g. deliberation councils to describe a 
significant aspect of government/business relationships and their positive merits in addressing 
co-ordination failures. The government practice in East Asia of setting performance targets 
for corporations with respect to exports was conceptualised in terms of arranging ‘export 
contests’. Such contests were thought to simulate competition and hence enhance economic 
efficiency.  
 
The third stage of the BWI’s analysis of East Asian development comes with the IMF’s 
examination of the current Asian crisis, referred to earlier. The current thesis of the IMF 
(1997) seems to have come full circle: the close government/business relationships and the 
deliberation councils are now apparently being viewed negatively as fostering cronyism and 




The contributors to the volume under review are broadly sympathetic to the EAM’s general 
approach - many of them were associated with the preparation of the EAM. They are, 
however, also critical in the sense that they do not think it goes far enough, is  too eclectic and 
is in some respects misleading. The editors, Aoki, Kim and Okuno-Fujiwara, situate the 
contribution of their book as a third way between the ‘market friendly’ strategy and the 
‘developmental state’ view of the role of the government in economic development. In a 
brilliant introductory chapter, Aoki, Kim and Okuno-Fujiwara use the insights from game 
theory, transactions cost theory, contracts theory and information theory to analyse the role of 
the government in advancing economic development. The essential argument is that co-
ordination problems are ubiquitous in market economies: among other things they arise from 
information asymmetries or other informational deficiencies; non-convexities; execution of 
large investment projects with strong complementarities. Such difficulties are likely to be 
particularly severe in developing countries where markets are likely to be even more 
incomplete or missing altogether than in advanced economies. The co-ordination problems 
can sometimes be solved by private bargaining, but often this may not be possible and state 
intervention is required. The authors’ central thesis however is that instead of the government 
intervening directly to achieve co-ordination, it should do so as far as possible indirectly by 
encouraging private organisations including firms, banks, trade associations and other civil 
society organisations to carry out this task. The intuition behind this proposition is that the 
central government does not have the local information available to lower level organisations. 
The authors call this  the ‘market-enhancing’ view which is perhaps a misnomer: it should 
more aptly be called the ‘visible hand’ analysis of markets in economic development.  
 
Aoki, Kim and Okuno-Fujiwara introduce several additional elements into this basic 
theoretical framework, e.g. path dependence, a taxonomy of rents including particularly the 
concept of contingent rents ( the government accords these to economic agents contingent on 
their meeting certain performance standards). The framework enables the authors to argue 
that the best way to investigate economic growth and to assess the role of the government is 
through comparative institutional analysis.  There is no single universal formula  to indicate 
when and which government interventions would be successful. It depends among other 
things on the level of economic development,  the past history of the country and the 
competence of the bureaucracy.  
 
Other chapters in this book  use case studies,  historical and country experiences as well as 
sectoral studies to examine the efficiency of government interventions in different contexts. 
Although the authors do not always agree with each other and sometimes use different 
concepts, the analytical framework of the introductory essay does help to give the volume an 
intellectual coherence. Many of the essays provide  rich historical or analytical contributions 
to the subject to which it is not possible to do full justice in the space of this review. 
Nevertheless what struck the reviewer as some of the interesting and important points made 
in a few of the other chapters are outlined below.  
 
Lawrence Lau examines the role of the government in the economic development of China, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. One of the more interesting observations he offers is that Deng 
Xiao-Ping’s visit to South China in 1992 and his strong affirmation of the Chinese 
government’s new economic policies helped to co-ordinate expectations and lift the country 
from a low growth to a high growth equilibrium. It led to the resumption of economic 
expansion and China’s subsequent boom after the slow-down in the post-Tiananmen period.  
Indeed he suggests that this visit may have strengthened economic growth not only in China 
but also in Taiwan and Hong Kong.  
 
Using newly available historical information for the period, Tetsuji Okazaki investigates the 
critical role of the government in the simultaneous development  of steel, coal, shipbuilding 
and machinery industries in Japan in the 1950s. It is suggested that an important reason for 
the government’s successful intervention were the high complementarities between the 
industries and the large scale of the investments required. This is indeed true but nevertheless 
it should not be forgotten that to have undertaken such a project at the time would have 
required not only considerable courage but also a great deal of vision and imagination. In the 
mid 1950s, Japan produced only 5 million tons of steel and 30,000 motor cars p.a.. The US at 
that time produced 90 million tons of steel and 7 million cars p.a. Japan was mainly an 
exporter of textiles and light manufacturing good. Further  Krueger (1995) has recently 
reminded us, the value of Japanese exports in 1952 was lower than that of India’s. It did not 
have the main raw materials for producing steel. The conventional wisdom of the time 
suggested that possession of raw materials and their close proximity to each other was a 
necessary condition for low cost steel production. The successful completion of this industrial 
programme by Japan which could not have occurred without the government’s crucial co-
ordinating role has confounded this belief for ever. 
 
Kiminori Matsuyama’s chapter outlines the nature of the co-ordination problem when the 
assumption of fixed knowledge is not valid. In a world of uncertainty and fast-moving 
technological developments which cannot be foreseen the co-ordination problem becomes 
much more serious. In these circumstances, local level co-ordination and experimentation 
may be more optimal than co-ordination by central government. 
 
Thomas Hellmann, Kevin Murdock and Joseph Stiglitz’ chapter is concerned with the 
informational and co-ordinational problems of the financial sector. They put forward an 
important new theory of ‘financial restraint’ in which the government restricts deposit rates 
and imposes other regulatory constraints on banks. The authors show these to be Pareto- 
superior to the laissez-faire policies. They also point out that financial restraint differs from 
financial repression in the sense that low deposit rates are established not to benefit the 
government but to improve the efficiency of the banking system. The authors’ analysis shows 
that developing countries should give precedence to the development of banks before 
establishing stock markets. Once a sound banking system is in place, a country can then make 
an informed choice whether to move towards the bank-dominated German-Japanese model or 
the stock market dominated Anglo-Saxon one.  
 
Cho’s excellent chapter on Korea notes the state’s extensive involvement in the financial 
markets: it owned the banks, controlled interest rates and directed a substantial portion of 
bank credits. The government control over financing was a major instrument for 
implementing its industrial policy. Cho notes that the “risk of government failures” was 
reduced by the “government’s continuous communication with business leaders and close 
monitoring of firms”. The government pushed the chaebol towards upgrading their 
technology and producing an ever-widening range of technologically more advanced 
products. In a developing country such production carried enormous technological risks for 
the individual firm. Without the government’s involvement as essentially co-partners and 
effective socialisation of the risk, the chaebol would not have been able to undertake such 
high risk projects. Overall, Cho deems these deep state interventions during the last four 
decades to be successful from the perspective of the real economy and industrialisation. 
However, he also suggests that a legacy of  these policies was an under-developed banking 
system.  
 
K S Jomo and Edmund Terence Gomez’ long essay on rents and economic development in 
Malaysia provides a fascinating account of the changing role of rent creation, distribution and 
deployment in that country during the last four decades. Their distinction between and 
analysis of developmental and redistributive rents are particularly insightful, The latter are 
designed to redistribute income and wealth from the minority Chinese community who own 




I turn now to the question of timing referred to at the beginning of the review. Do recent 
events in East Asia negate the analysis of the book that the state interventions in these 
economies have generally been beneficial in addressing co-ordination problems? Were the 
underlying structures faulty, as suggested by Greenspan and the IMF, which  led to cronyism, 
lack of transparency, over-investment, a disregard for profits and ultimately to the crisis. 
These issues have been investigated in detail in Singh (1998) and in Singh and Weisse 
(1998). The results do not provide any support for the IMF/Greenspan theses. At the outset 
these face an important difficulty: the structural  factors should not simply explain the current 
crisis but also why the same structures were so successful for so long. There was indeed over-
investment and a fall in profits as well as misallocation of resources (e.g. the property bubble 
in Thailand). However, these were not due to too much government intervention in the 
economy but rather to too little. In the period immediately preceding the crisis, governments 
like Thailand and Korea’s had begun to implement financial liberalisation which led to the 
abandonment of government co-ordination and controls over the allocation of investments as 
well as the close monitoring of borrowings abroad by large corporations and financial 
institutions. It was the lack of  co-ordination of corporate investment decisions which led to 
the observed phenomena of low profits and high investment. The unfortunate and incorrect 
analysis of the crisis by the IMF in the early stages suggesting that these economies had 
serious long term structural faults panicked the investors and further deepened the crisis. 
[ie.the IMF’s pronouncements, contrary to those of Deng in 1992 mentioned earlier, managed 
to co-ordinate expectations in the downward direction and helped produce an even worse 
equilibrium than before, Feldstein (1997)]. 
 
V 
Although the current crisis in East Asia does not in any way diminish the value of the 
contribution of this book in understanding the role of the government in the extraordinarily 
successful industrialisation of the region in the second half of the twentieth century, it 
nevertheless reveals certain weaknesses in the theoretical framework. Aoki, Kim and Okuno-
Fujiwara’s argument is micro-economic and their preference for local level co-ordination 
makes sense in that context. However, the theoretical framework does not explicitly consider 
the question of macro-economic co-ordination as well as the important connections between 
co-ordinations at the micro- and macro-economic levels. When macro-economic co-
ordination fails either because of external shocks or internal political difficulties resulting in a 
crisis, it becomes more difficult to effect micro-economic co-ordination as well. In the past, 
the East Asian governments have been particularly adept at ensuring the necessary macro-
economic balances (between savings and investments as well as the current account) at high 
growth rates. Industrial policy and micro-economic co-ordination were important instruments 
to maintain such macro-economic balances. The government however also used other 
measures to achieve these macro-economic equilibria including not just monetary and fiscal 
policy but also policies to enhance savings and so on. Clearly, macro-economic co-ordination 
can only be done at the level of the economy as a whole and not at the local level. Nor can it 
be taken for granted that it will always be carried out adequately by a government which is 
successfully able to implement an industrial policy, as the recent experience of Japan and East 
Asian countries illustrates. These matters need to be studied further. 
 
VI 
To sum up, for the reasons outlined in the review, this is an important book which deserves to 
be widely read for its theoretical as well as empirical analysis of micro-economic  
co-ordination problems at various stages of economic development. The general standard of 
papers is exceptionally high. Recent events in East Asian countries do not detract from the 
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